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NUSSBAUM: A UTILITARIAN CRITIQUE
MARK S. STEIN *
Abstract: This Essay ofTers a utilitarian perspective on Martha Nussbaum's
theory of justice. Nussbaum believes that society should guarantee to every
individual a threshold level of central human capabilities. Although Nuss-
baum's approach has considerable appeal, it is implausible and unappeal-
ing when it diverges greatly from utilitarianism. Nussbaum's theory se-
quires that enormous sums of money be devoted to people who receive
very little benefit from efforts to raise them toward a capability threshold.
Moreover, Nussbaum refitses to take a principled position on how conflicts
among below-threshold interests should be resolved, even when one alter-
native would produce enormously more good than another alternative.
Nussbaum mitigates these problems through an implicit incorporation of
utilitarianism to address conflicts among below-threshold interests, but this
partial adoption of utilitarianism cannot completely cure her theory. In
addition to critiquing Nussbaum's theory, this Essay responds to some of
Nussbaum's criticisms of utilitarianism. It rejects Nussbaum's claim that
utilitarianism is wrong to give weight to adaptive preferences. It also dem-
onstrates that Nussbaum misstates the relationship between her theory
and the doctrine of incommensurability: features of her theory that she at-
tributes to a denial of commensurability actually reflect a commitment to
commensurability across the capability threshold.
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I ofThr a utilitarian perspective on Professor Martha
Nussbaum's theory of justice.' Nussbaum holds that society should
"' Academic Fellow, Harvard Law School, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy,
Biotechnology, and Bioethics. J.D., University of Michigan; Ph.D., Yale University. I ac-
knowledge with thanks the financial support of the Petrie-Flom Center and the comments
of Einer Mange, Glenn Cohen, Frances Kamm, Abigail Moncriell, JP Sevilla, Tallia Syed,
Alicia Yamin, Chris Robertson, and the participants in the Petrie-Flom Health Care Policy
Reading Group. A very small part of this Essay is drawn from my hook Distributive justire
and Disability: Utilitarianism against Egalitarianism; that part is reprinted here with permis-
sion from Yale University Press.
The works of Nussbaum that I consider here are MARTIIA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS
OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEM BERM P (2006) [hereinafter Noss-
BAUM, FRONTIERS or JUSTICE] ; MA RTII A C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT: THE CAPA BI LITI ES APPROACH (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DENF,LOPMENT1; Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits . of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 291 LEGAL STun. 1005 (2000) [hereinafter Nussbaum, CiAsts of Tragedy]; and Mar-
tha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword: Cohstitutions and Capabilities:
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guarantee to every individual a threshold level of central human capa-
bilities. In addition, rich nations have an obligation to contribute a sub-
stantial portion of their national income to poor nations, and humans
have an obligation to promote the capabilities of nonhuman animals.
Nussbaum believes that her capabilities approach should guide the in-
terpretation of the U.S. Constitution. 2 She hopes that her approach will
eventually be supported by a political consensus in all nations. 5
Nussbaum's theory has considerable appeal. It is, however, implau-
sible and unappealing when it diverges greatly from utilitarianism. 4 I
explore some of the major differences between utilitarianism and her
theory, and I also respond to some of Nusshaum's criticisms of utilitari-
anism. 5
Utilitarianism is a benefit-maximizing theory. In the distribution of
scarce resources, utilitarianism tells us to help those who will most bene-
fit—those who will gain the most additional welfare. The greatest diver-
gence between utilitarianism and Nussbaum's capabilities approach oc-
curs when the capabilities approach requires that enormous sums be
devoted to people (or animals) who receive very little benefit from ef-
fortsto raise them toward a capability threshold. 6
In Part 1 of this Essay, I describe Nussbaum's theory and compare it
to utilitarianism and other theories of distributive justice.? Most con-
temporary theories of justice can usefully be described across two di-
"Perception" Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARy. L. Rev. 4 (2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum,
Constitutions and Capabilities].
In Constitutions and Capabilities, Nussbaum references FRONTIERS 1IF juslicr and
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT as illustrating her capabilities approach. See Nussbaum,
Constitutions and Capabilities, supra, at 10 11.7.
2 Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 1, at 58.
5 NussBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 163,
4 The utilitarian perspective 1 offer here differs from that of commentators in the legal
academy who have reviewed Nussbaum's book FRONTIERS or jusTicE, supra note I. For a
Rawlsian perspective, see &MW' Freeman, Frontiers of Justice: The Capabilities Approach vs.
Contractarianism, 85 Tex. L. kr.v. 385 (2006) (book review). For a disability rights perspec-
tive, see Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability and the Social Contract, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1615 (2007) (book review). For a review focusing on the problems of cosmopolitan-
ism, see Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022 (2007) (reviewing KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAII, COSMOPOLITANISM: ETHICS IN A WORLD OF STRANGERS (2006); KwAm
ANTHONY APPIAII, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS Or
JUSTICE, supra note I).
5 I present a general defense of utilitarianism against egalitarian theories in MARK S.
STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVEJUSTICE AND DISABILITY: UTILITARIANISM AGAINST EGALITARIANISM
(2006) [hereinafter STEIN, Dismilityrivr JusTicK AND DISABILITY]. See also Mark S. Stein,
Utilitarianism and Conflation, 35 Mull' 479 (2003), for a defense of utilitarianism against
the charge that it fails to respect the separateness of persons.
6 See infra notes 64-91 and accompanying text.
7
 See infra notes 12-61' and accompanying text.
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mensions, according to the metric they use and the principle or func-
tion they apply to the chosen metric. 8 Nussbaum uses a different metric
than utilitarianism, and she also applies different distributive principles.
In Part II, I critique Nussbaum's distributive principles. 9 Nussbaum
gives absolute priority to raising people toward a capabilities threshold.
This approach is unacceptably extreme, as indicated by the problem of
individuals for whom more can always be done, but for whom all the
resources of society will not suffice to raise them all the way to the
threshold. Nussbaum has never confronted this problem.
In another respect, Nussbaum's distributive principles are too
poorly defined rather than too extreme. Nussbaum refuses to take a
principled position on how to resolve below-threshold conflicts, even
when one alternative would produce enormously more good than an-
other alternative. This gap in Nussbaum's theory is mitigated because in
practice, Nussbaum applies a more-or-less utilitarian standard for resolv-
ing below-threshold conflicts. Nussbaum's implicit incorporation of
utilitarianism for below-threshold conflicts lends her theory consider-
able plausibility, but the lack of an explicit principle remains trouble-
some.
In Part [II, I discuss differences between Nussbaum's theory and
utilitarianism that arise from Nussbaum's use of the capabilities metric
rather than the metric of welfare.H' In the course of this discussion, I
reject Nussbaum's claim that it is wrong to respect adaptive prefer-
ences. I also demonstrate that Nussbaum misstates the place of incom-
mensurability in her theory. Features of her theory that she attributes
to a denial of commensurability actually reflect a commitment to com-
mensurability across the capability threshold. In conclusion, I consider
how Nussbaum might revise her theory to make it more plausible."
I. NUSSI3AUM'S THEORY AND WELFARIST ALTERNATIVES
In this Part, I set forth the basics of Nussbaum's capabilities ap-
proach and describe its relationship to other theories of justice. Nuss-
baum's theory is complicated, so it may be helpful to consider first the
class of welfarist theories to which utilitarianism belongs.
8 See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 112 (1996). A theory's metric can also he de-
scribed as the space in which it operates. See AMARTVA SEN, INEQUALITY REExAMINED 2
(1992).
9 See infra notes 62-190 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 191-232 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 233-236 and accompanying text.
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A. WeIfarism
Wellarist theories of justice use the metric of welfare or well-
being.' 2
 Wellarist theories apply different distributive principles, some-
times leading to widely different results.
Utilitarianism is the most prominent welfarist theory. The utilitar-
ian principle of distribution is unweighted maximization; utilitarianism
tells us to maximize welfare, giving equal weight to the welfare of eve-
ryone. 13
 As between two claimants for a resource, utilitarianism tells us
to prefer the one who would benefit more from the resource, "benefit"
being understood as an increase in welFare." I therefore refer to the
distributive principle of utilitarianism—unweighted maximization—as
the "benefit-maximizing" principle.
There are also egalitarian welfarist theories. By "egalitarian" I
mean a theory that gives absolute priority, within some range, to im-
proving the welfare of someone who is worse off, as opposed to improv-
ing the welfare of someone who is better off. 15 One kind of egalitarian
welfarist theory is maximin welfare egalitarianism, which tells us to
maximize the welfare of those who have the least welfare.'6 Another
kind of egalitarian welfarist theory is welfare sufficientarianism, which
tells us to raise everyone's welfare above a certain level.]? As between
two claimants for a resource, the egalitarian principle (in the range it
operates) tells us to prefer the one who is worse off. 18
Utilitarianism, then, tells its to help those who can most benefit,
while welfare egalitarianism tells us to help those who are worse 01E 19
12 The terms "welfare" and "well-being" are generally used interchangeably.
12 See JOAN C. HARSANYI, Nonlinear Social Welfare Functions: Do Welfare Economics IMve a
Special Exemption from Bayesian Relationality?, in ESSAYS ON ETHICS, SOCIAL. BEHAVIOR, AND
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 72 (1976); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 21 (2d ed. 1993);
STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND D/SABIL/TY, Supra note 5, at 33-35.
14 I assume no effects on anyone other than the two claimants. Any such effects would
also be evaluated under a greater-benefit criterion.
15 Philosophers do nut all use the term "egalitarian" in the same way. In recent years,
some have begun to use the term "egalitarian" to refer only to theories that would "level
down," that would reduce the welfare of the better-off without doing anything to benefit
the worse-off. See, eg., LARRY TEMKIN, INEQuAt-rry (1993). 1 do not adopt this usage, as it
would exclude most of the major theorists, such' as Rawls, who have been considered egali-
tarians and have considered themselves to be egalitarians.
16 ,SeeSTEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 75-91.
11 See Richard Arneson, Why .fustice Requires Transfers to Offset Income and Wealth Ine-
qualities, 19 Soc. Pun_ & POLICY, Winter 2002, at 172,173-74 (describing but not endors-
ing sufficientarianism). Sufficientarianism is only an egalitarian theory, in my sense of the
term, if it gives absolute priority to raising people above a certain level. If it gives less than
absolute priority to this goal, it is a prioritarian theory in its lower range.
18 See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 75-91.
19 See id.
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One can effect a compromise between these wellarist theories, mixing
the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism with the equalizing
principle of welfare egalitarianism." Such a mixed utilitarian-egalitarian
theory is often called prioritatianism. 21 Like utilitarianism, prioritarian-
ism seeks to maximize the welfare of everyone. 22 But unlike utilitarian-
ism, prioritarianism does not give equal weight to the welfare of every-
. one; it gives greater weight to the welfare of those who are worse off."
Like egalitarianism, prioritarianism gives priority to improving the wel-
fare of those who have less welfare. 24 But unlike egalitarianism, priori-
tarianism does not give absolute priority to those who have less wel-
fare. 25
B. Nussbaum's Theory
Nussbaum's metric is capabilities rather than welfare." She pre-
sents a long list of human capabilities, a list that has evolved over
time. 27 There are ten categories of capabilities, and many of the cate-
gories contain several different capabilities. Following is a truncated
version of Nussbaum's capabilities list, drawn from Frontiers of justice:
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of nor-
mal length ....
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health ... to be
adequately nourished
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to
place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual as-
sault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
2° See id. at 181.
21 See id. at 189-206; Derek Partin, Equality and Priority, in Ior.m.s or EQUALITY 12, 12-
13 (Andrew Mason ed., 1998).
" See. STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 189-206.
" See id.
24 See id.
s5
	 id.
" NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, M1p/TI note 1, at 69-81. Nussbaum takes the term
"capabilities" from Amartya Sen, but her theory is different in many respects from Sen's;
this essay concerns Nussbaum's capabilities approach, not yen's approach. For Sen's ap-
proach, see SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, Slept!! note 8. For my discussion of Sen, see
STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, MOD/ note 5, at 181-82. For another welfa-
rist critique of Sen, see generally Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-
Being?, 116 PHIL. REV. 603 (2007).
21 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, 5UPra note I, at 76-78.
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4. Sense, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the
senses, to imagine, think, and reason . . .. Being able to have
pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and
people outside ourselves . . . to love, to grieve, to experience
longing, gratitude, and justified anger.
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the
good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning
of one's life .	 .
7. Affiliation. Being able to ... engage in various forms of
social interaction .... This entails provisions of nondiscrimi-
nation on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity,
caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in re-
lation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational ac-
tivities.
10. Control over One's Environment. [1-flaving the right of po-
litical participation .... Being able to hold property ... being
able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason
and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recog-
nition with other workers. 28
As Nussbaum recognizes, there is considerable overlap between
the metric of capabilities and the metric of welfare. 29 Most of the capa-
bilities are clearly elements of welfare for most or all people. There are
also important differences between the metric of capabilities and the
metric of welfare; I explore these differences in Part 111. 30
Nussbaum's principle of distribution is egalitarian-sufficientarian.
She believes that justice requires every nation to raise every citizen to or
above a threshold level of each of the capabilities. 31 If it is not possible
to give some people all the capabilities up to the threshold level, a soci-
ety must give "as many of them, and as fully, as is possible." 32
The threshold level of each capability should be set "with an eye to
the other capabilities" and "should not be set in a utopian or unrealistic
21/ Id.
29 One source of the items on Nussbaum's capabilities list is the informed-preference
account of welfare. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 191-232 and accompanying text.
31 Her formulation varies between "to" and "above." Compare NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 182 ("to"), with id. at 75 ("above"). In this Essay, 1 generally use
the "to" formulation, though I do not achieve complete consistency either.
32 Id. at 222.
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way . . ."33 In determining the threshold level, some variability among
societies is permitted. 34 However, there are also some absolute re-
quirements." For example, a nation that provides free education only
to age twelve fails in its responsibility. 36
As between above-threshold interests and below-threshold inter-
ests, Nussbaum is an egalitarian: below-threshold interests have abso-
lute priority." There may be some doubt about this key aspect of Nuss-
baum's theory, so I explore it in brief detail. The absolute priority that
Nussbaum gives to below-threshold interests is often merely implicit in
her statements of principle." She repeatedly refers to the list of central
human capabilities as fundamental "entitlements," and states that socie-
ties have an obligation based in justice to raise every citizen to or above
the threshold level." As above-threshold interests are not said to be
fundamental entitlements, and are not said to he protected by justice, it
follows that they always have lower priority than below-threshold inter-
ests.
Sometimes Nussbaum is more explicit, making it clear that no
benefit to people who are above the capability threshold can justify
withholding any capability enhancement from - a person who is below
the threshold. 40 Thus, she states that "policies that improve the lot of a
group are to be rejected unless they deliver the central capabilities to
each and every person."41 Also, "each and every citizen is entitled to an
ample amount of each of these diverse goods, seen as capabilities, and
... society may not pursue overall advantage in a way that slights any
citizen's claim to them . . .. "42
In her article Costs of Tragedy, Nussbaum is only slightly less em-
phatic. There she states:
33 Id. at 402.
34 Id. at 179-80.
" Id.
36 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, satire note 1, at 180.
37 Id.; see infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
313 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 180.
" Id. at 75, 82, 85, 166, 182, 279, 290. "The capabilities approach ... is an account of
minimum core social entitlements . ." Id. at 75. "It is the whole set of such entitlements,
suitably defined, that is held to be required by justice, and no entitlement can substitute
for any other." Id. at 85. Capabilities are "fundamental entitlements of citizens." Id. at 166.
"The job of a decent society is to give all citizens the (social conditions of the) capabilities,
up to an appropriate threshold level." M at 182. "[AT] e all have entitlements based in jus-
tice to a minimum of each of the central goods on the capabilities list." Id. at 279. "[TJ he
central human capabilities are not simply desirable social goals, but urgent entitlements
grounded in justice." Id. at 290.
40 Id. at 216.
41 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, Supra note I, at 216.
42 Id. at 178.
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[I]f one or more [policy alternatives] involves violation of a
fundamental entitlement and the others do not, then there is
an extremely strong case for striking the tragedy-bearing al-
ternatives off the list; indeed, it would be hard to know what
could make one keep them on the list, other than a suspicion
that the list had been badly constructed, or the levels of enti-
tlements set too high. 43
Perhaps there is some equivocation in Costs of Tragedy, but it is very
small, and it is not repeated in Frontiers offustice. Thus, the most accu-
rate interpretation of Nussbaum's theory is that of Professor Peter
Singer: her priority for below-threshold interests is indeed absolute."
While Nussbaum is sensitive to cost in setting the capabilities thresh-
olds, she is insensitive to the cost of meeting entitlements once the
thresholds have been set. 45
Nussbaum has no principle for the resolution - of conflicts among
above-threshold interests. Somewhat strikingly, she also has no princi-
ple for the resolution of below-threshold conflicts. In Frontiers ofjustice,
Nussbaum proclaims:
[A] It ten of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements
of justice, at least up to the threshold level. In other words, the
theory does not countenance intuitionistic balancing or trade-
offs among them. The constitutional structure (once they are
put into a constitution or some other similar set of basic un-
derstandings) demands that they all be secured to each and
every citizen, up to some appropriate threshold level. In des-
perate circumstances, it may not be possible for a nation to
43 Nussbaum, Costs of Tragedy, supra note 1, at 1024.
44 Peter Singer, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, A Response to Martha Nuss-
baum (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://wwwutilitarian.net/singer/by/2002  1 I 3.hun.
Professor Alexander Kaufman suggests that Nussbaum may assign a less-than-absolute
priority to below-threshold interests. Alexander Kaufman, A Sufficientarian Approach? A
Note, in CAPABILITIES EQUALITY: BASIC ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 71, 72 (Alexander Kaufman
ed., 2006). But this suggestion is based 011 a misreading of Nussbaum's WOMEN AND Hu-
MAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 75. Nussbaum there states that "social and political
institutions should be chosen, at least in part, with a view to promoting at least a threshold
level of these human capabilities." Id, The context of this passage clearly indicates that the
term "at least in part" is not intended to signify that the priority for below-threshold inter-
ests is less than absolute; rather, once everyone has been raised to the threshold level, jus-
tice may impose further requirements. See id. In the very next sentence, Nussbaum states:
"But the provision of a threshold level of capability, exigent though that goal is, may not
suffice for justice, as I shall elaborate further later, discussing the relationship between the
social minimum and our interest in equality." Id.
43 As noted in Part II, the first kind of cost-sensitivity cannot necessarily substitute for
the second. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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secure them all up to the threshold level, but then it becomes •
a purely practical question what to do next, not a question of
justice. The question of justice is already answered: justice has
not been fully clone here. 46
In sum, Nussbaum has an egalitarian principle for cross-threshold con-
flicts, but she has no principle for above-threshold conflicts or below-
threshold conflicts.
Nussbaum extends the capabilities approach in Frontiers offustice to
address issues of international justice and inter-species justice. 47 While
stressing that each nation retains the responsibility to bring all its citi-
zens above the threshold, Nussbaum also concludes that rich nations
"have a responsibility to give a substantial portion of their GDP to poorer na-
tions."" She suggests that "the figure of 2 percent of GDP, though arbi-
trary, is a good sign of what might begin to be morally adequate." 49 As
to animals, Nussbaum concludes that humans have a responsibility to
promote the capabilities of non-human animals as well as the capabili-
ties of their fellow humans." She offers a list of animal capabilities,
many of which arc the same as the capabilities on the human list, or
similar to them. 51 On the use of animals for food, Nussbaum states that
"Olt seems wise to focus initially on banning all forms of cruelty to liv-
ing animals and then moving gradually toward a consensus against kill-
ing at least the more complexly sentient animals for food." 52
Every distributive theory faces "frontier" problems. Who is to be
included as a beneficiary of the theory, and are all to count equally? To
its credit, utilitarianism is often associated with a concern to reduce all
suffering, including the suffering of foreigners and non-human ani-
mals." I welcome Nussbaum's extension of her own approach to inter-
national and inter-species matters. I will for the most part evaluate
Nussbaum's theory in the context of distribution within a single nation,
for ease of analysis. All the points that follow, however, can be made
NussIMUNI, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra tinic I, at 175.
47 See id. at '273-405. She also fleshes out her position on disability and health. Id. at
90-216. But disability is not an extension in the same sense, because no new principles are
offered,
48 M. at 316.
49 14. at 317. Currently, even the most generous countries fall short of this standard. See
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEN., TARGEIS SLIPPING OUT OF REActt? 6 (2008),
available at littp://www.oecd.org/dataoecc1/47/25/41724319.pdf,
w NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF . JUSTICE, Sitpra note I, at 393-401.
51
52 Id. at 393.
53 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990); PETER SINGER, ONE
WORLD: THE ETtitcs OF GLOBALIZATION (2d ed. 2009).
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also about global redistribution and treatment of animals because those
aspects of Nussbaum's theory have similar features, including the obli-
gation to bring people (or animals) to a threshold, and the refusal to
specify principles for the resolution of below-threshold conflicts. 54
C. Resourcist Theories
Welfarist theories are not the only alternative to Nussbaum's capa-
bilities approach. Some theories of distributive justice use the metric of
material resources—income and wealth. Resourcist theories are not the
focus of this essay; I mention them briefly because of their importance
and because they can provide some useful contrasts. 55
The late John Rawls's theory is a resourcist theory; Rawls applies
the egalitarian principle to the metric of resources. 56 A great part of
Nussbaum's book Frontiers- ofjustice is given to a critique of Rawls. 57
It is also possible to apply the benefit-maximizing principle to the
metric of resources. The result is the theory of wealth-maximization.
Judge Richard Posner advocated this theory for many years," though
he eventually drew back from it somewhat. 59 In the development field,
wealth-maximization is the only normative theory that can view eco-
nomic growth as an end in itself, rather than as a means to improve the
welfare of people.
A major difference between utilitarianism and wealth-
maximization is that utilitarianism is concerned with the distribution of
wealth." Because the poor benefit more from additional money than
54 NusstiAum, FRONTIERS OF JusTicE, supra note 1, at 273-405.
55 Ronald Dworkin refers to his theory as "equality of resources." RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 65-119 (2000). I do not,
however, consider Dworkin either a resourcist or an egalitarian; as I have argued, his hypo-
thetical-choice distributive device is essentially utilitarian. See STEIN, DisTioutuTivE JUSTICE
AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 119-57; Mark S. Stein, Ronald Dworkin on Redistribution to
the Disabled, 51 SvitAcusE L. REV. 987 (2001). A similar argument is made in Marc Fleur-
baey, Equality of Resoulres Revisited, 113 ETnics 82 (2002).
56 See, e.g.. JOIN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2001) [hereinafter
RAWLS, jusTIcE AS FAIRNESS]; JOHN RAWLS, A Tintottv OFjusTucE (Erin Kelly ed., 1971)
[hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. I discuss Rawls's theory in STEIN, DISTRIBU-
TIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, .supra note 5, at 102-18.
57 For a Rawlsian response, see Samuel Freeman, supra note 4.
55 See, e.g., Rica tAito A. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
" For an overview of the evolution of Posner's views, see Louis Kaplow & Ste'ven Shov-
el], Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Rum L. REv. 961, 99611.68 (2001).
60 Utilitarianism is not concerned with the distribution of welfare, however. Critics of
utilitarianism often consider this indifference to the distribution of welfare to be a detect.
Fur my response, see STEIN, DisTtunuTivE jusTicE AND DisAtumrrv, supra note 5, at
06.
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do the rich, utilitarians almost always support some measure of redis-
tribution from rich to poor. 61
II. NUSSBAUM'S DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES (OR LACK THEREOF)
Nussbaum uses a different metric than utilitarianism and also dif-
ferent principles of distribution. In Part III below, I focus on Nuss-
baum's metric. 62 In this Part, I focus on her principles (or lack
thereof). The two key features here are Nussbaum's absolute priority
for below-threshold interests and her failure to supply principles for the
resolution of conflicts among below-threshold interests."
A. Cross-Threshold Egalitarianism and the Problem of Insatiable Entitlements
It is impossible to raise everyone to the threshold of all of the ca-
pabilities. Some people will not have the capability to "live to the end of
a human life of normal length,"64 even if all the world's resources are
devoted to prolonging their lives." Similarly, all the world's resources
will not suffice to enable some people to rise to the threshold of other
capabilities: to "have good health," to be "able to use the senses," to be
"able to form a conception of the good," and so forth. 66
The impossibility of raising every person to the threshold of all
capabilities is not, in itself, a problem for Nussbaum's theory. The prob-
lem is that even when it is impossible to raise people to the threshold, it
is often possible to spend an unlimited amount of resources raising
them toward the threshold. Often enormous investments—another doc-
tor, another hospital, another medical research project—can make
some improvement, however small, or can increase, however slightly,
the likelihood of achieving a large improvement. This is the problem of
insatiable entitlements, also known as the problem of voracious needs 67
or the bottomless-pit problem. 68
61 See id. at 33-35.
62 See infra notes 191-232 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
64 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, SUPra note 1, at 76.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 77.
67 CHARI,ES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 121-22 (1978).
6" Norman Daniels, health-Care Needs and Distributive justice, 10 Pint_ &	 Arr. 14(1,
172 (1981). While evocative, the term "bottomless pit" may be somewhat misleading. If you
were trying to fill in a truly bottomless pit, you would not make any progress at all. But a
key feature of the problem of insatiable entitlements is that it is possible to improve with-
out limit, however slightly, the condition or expected condition of those who arc worse off,
through additional expenditures.
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The problem has been memorably described, in somewhat differ-
ent contexts, by Professor Kenneth Arrow and also by Professor Charles
Fried. Arrow states: "[T] here can easily exist medical procedures which
serve to keep people barely alive but with little satisfaction and which
arc yet so expensive as to reduce the rest of the population to pov-
erty." 69 Fried adds: "[T]here is literally no end to the drain on re-
sources that medicine might represent .... [T]here is always the possi-
bility of devoting endless research funds to the development of relief
measures which do not now exist.""
The problem of insatiable entitlements involves diminishing re-
turns to social spending; however, the phrase "diminishing returns"
does not adequately describe the problem. Often it is reasonable to
pursue a spending program that has diminishing returns—say, a pro-
gram to reduce infant mortality. The second million dollars spent on
the program will save fewer lives than the first million, let us assume,
but the second million should still be spent on the program if the
money would do less good otherwise. An insatiable entitlement is one
in which a (non-utilitarian) theory of justice requires spending for the
benefit of an individual long past the point where additional spending
will do much good, and under circumstances where the individual's
claim cannot ever be fully satisfied.
The problem of insatiable entitlements is one that commonly af-
flicts egalitarian theories. 71 Unfortunately, Nussbaum fails to confront
the problem; she appears not to be aware of it. Indeed, she often seems
not even to be aware that it is impossible for any nation to raise all its
citizens to the capabilities thresholds. Consider her statement that " [i] n
desperate circumstances, it may not be possible for a nation to secure
them [the capabilities] all up to the threshold level, but then it be-
comes a purely practical question what to do next, not a question of
justice." 72 The reference to "desperate circumstances" suggests that it is
an unusual situation, perhaps characteristic of a very poor nation, in
which the nation cannot secure all the capabilities up to the threshold
level. In fact, this situation is universal; it holds always in every country,
even the very richest. In every country, there will be people who do not
live to a normal lifespan, and so on. Another example of Nussbaum's
64) Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls's Theory of Justice, 701
Pon_ 245, 251 (1973). This comment is made in a review of Rawls, but it actually pertains
more to welfare egalitarianism than to Rawls's theory. See id.
70 FRIED, supra note 67, at 122.
71 Though nut resource-egalitarian theories; they have other problems. See STEIN, DIS-
TRIBUTIVE:ins-mu: AND. DISABILITY, 51,pra note 5, at 63-75.
72 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note I, at 175.
2009]	 Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique	 501
failure to grasp the problem is her insistence that her theory is only a
partial account of justice, one that is "compatible with different views
about how to handle issues of justice and distribution that would arise
once all citizens are above the threshold level."" But all citizens will
never be above the threshold level.
When referring to health-related capabilities, Nussbaum some-
times observes that government need provide only the "social basis" of
these capabilities. 74 This observation does not appear to be an attempt
to deal with the insatiable-entitlements problem, and in fact it does not
deal with the problem. The social basis of the capabilities includes
money, and society could spend an unlimited amount of money at-
tempting to satisfy insatiable entitlements."
Nussbaum also cannot avoid the problem of insatiable entitle-
ments by adjusting the capability thresholds. While Nussbaum observes
that "the level of education that should be provided free of charge by
the state may vary somewhat in accordance with the type of economy
and employment in a state," her theory does not permit major health-
related capabilities to be keyed to expenditure levels in this way. 76 If it
did, her theory would be a resourcist theory, not a capabilities-based
theory. The capability "Life" is a capability to "live to the end of a hu-
man life of normal length," not a capability to receive a certain level of
health care or health insurance coverage. 77
Nussbaum comes closest to confronting the insatiable-entitlements
problem when she discusses whether the capabilities list and threshold
levels should be adjusted for those with severe mental disability. In her
discussion of mental disability, Nussbaum continually refers to three
actual individuals: Sesha, a person with severe mental retardation who
is the daughter of Professor Eva Feder Kittay, and who is featured in
Kittay's book Love's Labor;" Jamie, a person with Down syndrome who
is the son of Professor Michael Beruhe, and who is featured in Berube's
71 Id. at 75.
74 Id. at 193; NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND l'IUMAN DEVELOPMENT, .iu/ra note 1, at 81-82,
89.
75 CT Michael L Corrado, Disability and Nationality: Martha Nussbaum on justice 17 (Univ.
of N.C. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 1,117,633, 2008), available at
hup://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.clin?abstractjd=1117635  ("[W liar is the 'social basis'
of a capability, and how is it distinguished from the capability itself? This is a question that
Nussbaum does not answer.").
76 See. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS Or JUSTICE, supra note I, at 180.
77 See id. at 76.
76 EVA FEDER KICTAY, LANE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY
(1999).
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book Life As We. Know ll; 79 and Arthur, a person with Asperger syn-
drome who is Nussbaum's nephew. 80 Reflecting on Sesha's case, Nuss-
baum concludes that it is impossible to give her all the capabilities up
to the threshold leve1. 8I She then considers and rejects the idea of
"forming" the capabilities list or threshold level:
[U]sing a different list of capabilities or even a different
threshold of capability as the appropriate social goal for peo-
ple with impairments is practically dangerous, because it is an
easy way of getting off the hook, by assuming from the start
that we cannot or should not meet a goal that would be diffi-
cult and expensive to meet. Strategically, the right course
seems to be to harp on the single list as a set of nonnegotiable
social entitlements, and to work tirelessly to bring all children
with'disabilities up to the same threshold of capability that we
set for other citizens .. [Hor political purposes it is generally
reasonable to insist that the central capabilities are very impor-
tant for all citizens, and thus worth the expenditures that may
have to be made on those with unusual impairments. 82
As to Sesha, "Cslociety should strive to give her as many of the capabili-
ties as possible directly; and where direct empowerment is not possible,
society ought to give her the capabilities through a suitable arrange-
ment of guardianship."88
These passages make clear Nussbaum's view that when it is impos-
sible for people to attain the threshold level, society has an obligation
to bring them as close as possible to the threshold. 84 This should per-
haps be an obvious implication of Nussbaum's theory, but Nussbaum
rarely acknowledges that it is impossible for all people to attain the
threshold. Accordingly, she almost always phrases the social obligation
as one to raise people to or above the threshold, without specifying
what is to be done for those who cannot rise that far.
In her discussion of mental disability, Nussbaum does confront the
impossibility of raising everyone to the capability thresholds—at least,
those thresholds that relate to mental disability. 85 However, Nussbaum
1411CHAEL BgRUI4, LIFE AS 'WE KNOW IT: A FATHER, A FAMILY, AND AN EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD (1996).
NUSSBAUM, Fitc.wrrEtts 1W Jus•icE, supra note 1, at 96-97.
131 Id. at 188.
82 Id at 190.
82 Id. at 193.
81 Id. at 190, 193; see also id. at 222 ("as litany or them, and as fully, as is possible").
85 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS or JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 188.
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does not take the next step and confront the insatiable-entitlements
problem. 86 She seems to assume that though bringing the mentally dis-
abled as close as possible to the threshold may be "difficult and expen-
sive," it does have a finite cost; we quickly reach a point where nothing
whatsoever can be done through further expenditures. 87 She does not
acknowledge that for some disabilities, at least, it is always possible to
make further small improvements, or to increase slightly the probability
of making large improvements, by spending ever greater amounts of
money. 88
It is also unclear whether Nussbaum realizes that her theory faces
the same or worse problems with physical disability as with mental dis-
ability. As noted, there are some people who will never be able to live to
the end of a human life of normal length, who will never be able to
have good physical health, and so on. If Nussbaum were to "norm" the
capabilities approach for those with severe mental disabilities—a course
she rejects—she presumably would have to do the same for those with
severe physical disabilities. 89
In setting the capability thresholds, Nussbaum tries to be sensitive
to cost; she would like to avoid setting the thresholds "in a utopian or
unrealistic way."99 She tries not to take account of cost in cross-
threshold conflicts; below-threshold interests have absolute priority. But
because of differences among people, and in particular the problem of
insatiable entitlements, this bifurcated approach does not work. If there
is going to be the same threshold for everyone (a position to which
Nussbaum is committed), it would have to be set at a ridiculously low
level to avoid the problem of insatiable entitlements.
Suppose Nussbaum were to adopt the adjustment that she rejects
in Frontiers offustice: lowering the threshold level for some people. 91 For
whom would the threshold be lowered, and by how much? One ap-
proach would be to say that if the expense of moving toward the thre-
shold is too great in relation to the capability increase, the threshold
must be lowered until the expense is not too great in relation to the
capability increase. That would of course be an improvement; it would
88 See id.
87 Id. at 190.
88 A similar point is made by Professor David Wasserman near the end of his essay on
Nussbaum. David Wasserman, Disability, Capability, and Thresholds for Distributive justice, in
CAPABILITIES EQUALITY, supra note 44, at 214, 230.
89 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 190.
9° Id. at 402.
See id. at 193.
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be a roundabout way of limiting capability claims through the benefit-
maximizing principle of utilitarianism.
In any event, Nussbaum has not adjusted her theory to deal with
the insatiable-entitlements problem. Insatiable entitlements have abso-
lute priority over all above-threshold interests. The capability "Life"
alone imposes unlimited demands that exceed the resources of every
country. Despite Nussbaum's caution that the capability thresholds
should not be set in a utopian or unrealistic way, her cross-threshold
egalitarianism makes her theory utopian and unrealistic.
B. Below-Threshold Conflicts
Although Nussbaum has a clear—and wrong—priority rule for
cross-threshold conflicts, she has no explicit principle to resolve con-
flicts among below-threshold interests. In Costs of Tragedy, she observes
that "[w]henever the capabilities approach is presented to an audience
containing economists and policy makers, the first question that is typi-
cally posed is, How do we make trade-offs when we cannot provide
people with all the capabilities on the list?" 92 It seems almost to be a
point of pride for Nussbaum that she has never answered this question.
As noted, she proclaims in Frontiers of Justice that
all ten of these plural and diverse ends are minimum requirements of
justice, at least up to the threshold level. In other words, the
theory does not countenance intuitionistic balancing or trade-
offs among them. The constitutional structure (once they are
put into a constitution or some other similar set of basic un-
derstandings) demands that they all be secured to each and
every citizen, up to some appropriate threshold level. 93
Commentators, including myself, have observed that Nussbaum's
failure to specify any principles for the resolution of below-threshold
conflicts is a major gap in her theory." The insatiable-entitlements
problem shows that this gap is even wider than may initially appear.
Due to insatiable entitlements, below-threshold conflict will always ex-
ist. 95 In every society, there will always be people below the thresholds
for whom more could be done, but for whom all the resources of soci-
ety will not suffice to raise them to all the _thresholds. Insatiable enti-
92 Nussbaum, Costs of Tragedy, supra note 1, at 1028.
93 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 175.
94 STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 187; Silvers & Stain,
sopa note 4, at 1638.
93 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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Clements pertaining to various capabilities will always clamor for addi-
tional resources, along with entitlements that can more efficiently be
met. 96 There must be some way of adjudicating these claims.
As Nussbaum does not recognize the insatiable-entitlements prob-
lem, she also does not recognize the ubiquity of below-threshold con-
flict." Thus, she states that "if the capabilities list and its threshold are
suitably designed, we ought to say that the presence of' conflict between
one capability and another is a sign that society has gone wrong some-
where."98 But since the insatiable-entitlements problem guarantees that
below-threshold conflict will be ubiquitous, the mere presence of be-
low-threshold conflict is not necessarily a sign that "society has gone
wrong somewhere."99
Nussbaum's refusal to endorse principles for the resolution of be-
low-threshold conflicts is doubtless related to her insistence that the
capabilities are incommensurable, meaning that they are not reducible
to a single scale of value.mo Nussbaum's silence on below-threshold
conflicts, however, goes far beyond a refusal to reduce all capabilities to
a single scale of value. Nussbaum does not even provide any distributive
principles for resolving conflicts within a single capability. 101 She does
not indicate that she would resolve below-threshold conflicts, even
" See FRIF,D, supra note 67, at 122 ("The fact is that if we were to recognize a right to
the satisfaction of mu' most unfortunate fellow citizens' medical needs, the drain on re-
sources available to satisfy other kinds of needs (education, defense, housing) and also to
satisfy all the residual wants of healthy, secure, educated persons would be staggering.").
97 Conversely, Nussbaum's Etiltire to recognize the ubiquity of below-threshold conflict
is yet another indication that she fails to recognize that her theory has an insatiable-
entitlements problem.
4B
	
FRONTIERS OE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 401.
" See id. Certain kinds of conflicts may signify had social policy, though.
1 °° Id. at 165-67. For a discussion of the issue of incommensurability, see infra notes
214-224 and accompanying text.
1 ° 1 in Costs of Tragedy, Nussbaum oilers a grudging acceptance of cost-benefit analysis,
after subjecting it to much criticism. Rut she explicitly rejects utilitarianism and wealth
maximization as theories that might guide cost-benefit analysis. Nussbaum, Costs of Tragedy,
supra note I, at 1028-29. She even argues that cost-benefit analysis does not presuppose
commensurability, an argument that is hard to credit: what is cost-benefit analysis if not a
reduction of competing options to a single scale of value? See id. at 1030-31. In context,
Nussbaum appears to say only that it is important to know the consequences of policies,
but without offering a way of evaluating the consequences: '
101 ne thing we certainly need to know, before we act, is how the costs and
benefits balance out, looking at the totality , of the factors. Cost-benefit analysis
provides a handy model, or group of models, for representing our practical
thinking on complex questions of' choice, where we must choose among plu-
ral and diverse goods and where our choices have complex consequences as
well as involve complex issues of intrinsic value.
Id, at 1030.
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within one capability, by favoring those who could gain the greatest in-
crease in capability, by favoring those who have the lowest level of capa-
bility, or by maximizing the number of people who can rise to the thre-
shold . io2
Suppose we had to choose to help either person A, person B, or
persons C and D, all of whom would fall below the threshold of the ca-
pability "Life" without our help)" Person A, without our help, would
live to T-40 (that is, forty years less than the normal lifespan); we can
give her another twenty years, increasing her lifespan to T-20. Person B,
without our help, would live to T-50; we can give him another five years,
increasing his lifespan to T-45. Persons C and D, without our help,
would both live to T-2; we can give them both an additional two years,
bringing them up to the threshold of the capability "Life." A benefit-
maximizing principle applied to the metric of life years would tell us to
help person A, as she can gain the greatest number of life years. 104 An
equalizing principle would tell us to help person B, as he is farthest be-
low the capability threshold. 1 °5 And a principle of maximizing the
number of people who are above the threshold would tell us to help
persons C and D. Nussbaum's theory does not give us any guidance
here. ) °6
J°2 Id. at 1028-31.
105 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS Or . JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 76 (defining the "Life' capa-
bility as being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length).
101 This is the principle of life-year maximization, which is similar though not identical
to utilitarianism. See. STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 222-65.
105 See id. at 244-45.
100 On below-threshold priorities, the book CAPABILITIES EQUALITY, supra note 44, ed-
ited by Alexander Kaufman, may be a source of confusion. In his entry, Professor Richard
Arneson discusses a sufficientarian theory of the same kind as Nussbaum's, except that he
supplies a principle for below-threshold conflicts. Richard Arneson, Distributive Justice and
Basic Capability Equality: "Good Enough" Is Not Good Enough, in CAPABILITIES EQUALITY, supra
note 44, at 17, 27. I-le writes:
Consider this version of sufficiency: As many as possible of' those who shall
ever live should he brought to the good enough threshold level of lifetime
well-being, This principle is understood to have strict lexical priority over
other justice values, including gains to those above arid below the ... thresh-
old that do not alter the numbers of people who are sustained at sufficiency.
Id. Arneson does not actually attribute to Nussbaum this principle of maximizing the
number of people who can be raised to the threshold. See id. But in his own entry, Profes-
sor David Wasserman goes further and does seem to attribute to Nussbaum the principle
that Arneson supplies: "Arneson finds deficient priority fin the worse off in Nussbaum's
emphasis on bringing as many people as possible up to her minima." Wasserman, supra
note 88, at 214, 229. In fact, Nussbaum nowhere adopts the principle of raising as many
people to the threshold as possible as a way of resolving below-threshold conflicts.
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The only suggestion Nussbaum has offered of an explicit priority
rule to resolve below-threshold conflicts is that "we should attach more
importance to. the large items on the list than to their more specific
subsections." 107 Nussbaum gives this directive in discussing potential
political participation by those with severe intellectual disability, such as
Sesha. 1 °8 Nussbaum remarks: "[E]ven if Sesha cannot become a poten-
tial voter, we should ask what other ways there might be to give her po-
litical membership and the possibility of some political activity (al-
though we also would allow her a vote through a guardian, as a sign of
her full political equality)." 109 This limited priority rule, of course, does
not resolve the contending claims of the many people who fall below
one or more thresholds on the large items of "Life," "Health," and so
on, including all those with insatiable entitlements.
1. Intuitionistic Balancing
Given the ubiquity of below-threshold conflict, Nussbaum's state-
ment that her theory "does not countenance intuitionistic balancing or
trade-offs" of below-threshold capabilities is actually incorrect. 110 This
statement signifies Nussbaum's refusal to say how tradeoffs should be
made. But ubiquitous below-threshold conflict means that there must
be tradeoffs. And since Nussbaum refuses to say how tradeoffs should
be made, the only thing left is intuitionistic balancing.
The term "intuitionism" has more than one usage in philoso-
phy. 111 Nussbaum's mistaken insistence that her theory does not coun-
tenance intuitionistic balancing comes in the context of an imagined
critique of her theory by Rawls. 112 She uses the term "intuitionism" in
the same way Rawls did: to denote a pluralist ethics, an ethics that has
more than one principle or goal, but no rule For resolving conflicts. 113
Prioritarianism, the theory that mixes elements of utilitarianism
and welfare egalitarianism, is in effect such a pluralist ethics. 114 Priori-
tarians rarely if ever specify how much additional weight they would
give to those who are worse oFf. 115 Rather, they apply the benefit-
107 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 194.
1 °8 Id.
109 Id .
no Id. a t 175.
See, e.g., RAWLS, A THEORY Or JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 34-40; STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 10-22.
112 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 173-76.
112 See RAW Ls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 34-40.
114
	
STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, Allpra note 5, at 180-206, For a
discussion oF the contest between utilitarianism and prioritarianism.
115 See id.
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maximizing principle of utilitarianism and the egalitarian principle of
welfare egalitarianism in an ad hoc, intuitionistic way, sometimes favor-
ing those who are worse off and sometimes favoring those who can
most benefit. 116 Indeed, some theorists explicitly advocate a pluralist
ethics that respects both aggregate welfare and equality, rather than
attempting to integrate these goals into a single theory." 7
As the example of prioritarianism should make clear, Nussbaum is
even less forthcoming about the resolution of conflicts than the ethical
pluralist "intuitionism" Rawls had in mind. Ethical pluralists at least tell
you what their principles are, even if they cannot say in advance how
they would resolve conflicts among those principles." 8 But with Nuss-
baum, no principles are even specified.
2. justice and Below-Threshold Conflicts
Nussbaum is also wrong to say that the resolution of below-
threshold conflicts is "a purely practical question what to do next, not a
question of justice."" 9 A major part of the field of bioethics concerns
the distribution of scarce medical resources, for example. 12° Typically,
claimants for medical resources are below any reasonably defined
threshold of health, life, and/or practical reason. 121 Is it not an issue of
justice who is to receive a scarce organ transplant? Which medical re-
search programs should be funded?
Given the ubiquity of below-threshold conflict, Nussbaum's claim
that the resolution of below-threshold conflict is not a "question of jus-
tice" sweeps very broadly. 122 Every time the government spends money
on any below-threshold interest, it could instead spend money on other
below-threshold interests; certainly, it could instead spend money on
any of a number of insatiable entitlements. If below-threshold conflicts
are not a matter of justice, no one can ever claim that justice requires
any particular government program (the only exception would be pro-
116 Cf. id. at 190 (arguing that the only plausible prioritarian theory must approximate
unweighted utilitarian values).
117 See id. at 180-89.
116 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 34-40.
119 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 175.
120 See, e.g., ROBERT M. VEATcli, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 277-79 (2000); Mark S.
Stein, The Distribution of Life-Saving Medical Resources: Equality, Life Expectancy, and Choice
Behind the Veil, Soc. PHIL. & Pot.'v, Summer 2002, at 212,221.
III See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 76-77.
122 See id. at 175.
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grams that pay for themselves, by generating revenue even as they help
those below the capabilities thresholds). 123
Ironically, Nussbaum criticizes Rawls for having an artificially nar-
row conception of justice. 124 Nussbaum's specific complaint is that
Rawls fails to address the interests of people with disabilities as a matter
of basic justice. 125 I generally concur with this criticism of Rawls, having
previously offered a version of it myse11. 126 But with her refusal to speak
to below-threshold conflicts, Nussbaum is at least as much subject to
this kind of criticism as is Rawls. Indeed, some of Nussbaum's language
echoes that of Rawls. 127 Nussbaum quotes with evident disapproval
Rawls's claim that care for those with expensive medical requirements,
while a "pressing practical question," is not part of the "fundamental
problem of social justice." 128 She herself, however, uses a similar locu-
tion ("purely practical ... not a question of justice") in her attempt to
avoid addressing below-threshold conflicts. 129
C. Can a Below-Threshold Application of Utilitarianism Save
the Capabilities Approach?
Insatiable entitlements, I have observed, make Nussbaum's lack of
below-threshold principles a more serious problem than may first ap-
pear. But fortunately for Nussbaum, her lack of below-threshold princi-
ples may make insatiable entitlements a less serious problem than may
first appear. Nussbaum's theory does require nations to spend billions
of dollars to prolong, however slightly, the lives of those who die prema-
turely of incurable illness, and it requires further billions to address
other insatiable entitlements)" But her theory also requires a great
many sensible expenditures to prolong life and improve health. 131 Her
theory gives absolute priority, as against above-threshold interests, to
very welfare-inefficient uses of funds, but it also gives absolute priority,
123 As noted in Section C, Nussbaum herself does not really believe that the resolution
of below-threshold conflict is not a "question of justice," as she does advocate specific pro-
grams. See infra notes 141-149 and accompanying text.
124 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 108-27.
in Id.
126 See Mark S. Stein, Rawls on Redistribution to the Disabled, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 997,
1004-05 (1998).
127 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 110.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 175.
I" See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (discussing Nussbaum's absolute pri-
ority for below-threshold interests).
131 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. For some examples of sensible in-
vestments, sec Gareth Jones et al., How Many Child Deaths Can We Prevent Mis Year?, 362
LANCET 65 (2003).
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as against above-threshold interests, to welfare-efficient uses of funds. 152
Among below-threshold interests, Nussbaum's theory does not explic-
itly give priority to uses of funds that will benefit people the most, but at
least it does not give priority to uses of flinds that will benefit people
the least.'" Nussbaum's theory, therefore, appears more plausible than
some other egalitarian theories one might conceive.
Maximin welfare egalitarianism, for example, would likely fasten
on some smaller set of insatiable entitlements, and would give absolute
priority to those entitlements. 154 Suppose that infants who will die
within one month of birth are considered to have the least welfare of all
people, because their lives have been shortest. Then maximin welfare
egalitarianism will give absolute priority to prolonging the lives of these
neonates. Of course, there arc a great many welfare-efficient measures
that could be taken to reduce neonatal mortality, especially in develop-
ing countries.'" Utilitarianism, along with various egalitarian theories,
would support such measures (and would support funding them from
the resources of rich count•ies). 136 But even after all the welfare-
efficient measures are undertaken, maximin welfare egalitarianism
would require countries to continue reducing neonatal mortality if any
reduction at all could be achieved. 137 Even if it would cost a million dol-
lars to prolong the life of a neonate one extra minute, maximin welfare
egalitarianism would require that expense. 138
Nussbaum, of course, is not necessarily committed to spending a
million dollars to buy an extra minute of life for a neonate, as long as
other below-threshold improvements can be made instead. 1 " Nuss-
baum's theory is more vague than maximin welfare egalitarianism in
addressing below-threshold conflict, and so is less objectionable.
Still, it is objectionable. To have no principle for below-threshold
conflict is better than having the wrong principle, but it is worse than
having the right principle. A theory of justice should be able to tell us
that the welfare-egalitarian theory sketched above is wrong, that it is
152 See upra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
153 See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 189-206.
154 Id. at 75-91.
153 See Joy E. Lawn et al., 4 Million Neonatal Deaths: When? Where? Why?, 365 LANCET 891
(2005).
136 Utilitarianism would support such measures because they would increase welfare,
egalitarian theories because they would help the worse oft For a utilitarian perspective on
international redistribution, see SINGER, supra note 53.
137 See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 75-91.
135 The same fixation on a class of insatiable entitlements would occur if some other
class, such as young people with terminal cancer; were identified as those having the least
welfare. See id.
139 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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wrong to purchase a minute of neonatal life at the cost of a million dol-
lars (which could save many lives of people who are older than one
month). True, this example is extreme, and the right decision is obvi-
ous. But that only makes Nussbaum's failure to supply a principle that
can reach the right decision an even greater defect.
In imagining the operation of Nussbaum's theory, we do likely give
her the benefit of the doubt. We likely assume that Nussbaum's theory
would not waste public funds on insatiable entitlements at the expense
of highly beneficial programs. In other words, we assume that in resolv-
ing below7threshold conflicts, Nussbaum's theory would give consider-
able weight to the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism. Her
theory need not apply a strict utilitarian standard for below-threshold
conflict; it would gain plausibility even by applying a prioritarian ap-
proach, which mixes utilitarian and welfare-egalitarian elements (though
in my view only a version of prioritarianism that is close to utilitarianism
can be truly plausible). 140
We are right to give Nussbaum the benefit of the doubt, for her
policy choices do implicitly reflect a benefit-maximizing principle, even
though she refuses to endorse that principle. For example, Nussbaum
supports expensive special education programs for children with dis-
abilities and government-limded care for intellectually disabled people
who need care. 141 She touts the benefits of such programs for jamie," 2
Arthur, 143 and Sesha.144 As to Arthur, she observes:
After some years of failure with the public school system, even
with a special monitor, the state agreed to support Arthur's
education in a special private school for children with [Asper-
ger syndrome). He is now making rapid cognitive and behav-
ioral/affective progress. He holds parties and has friends. He
simply is no longer stigmatized. His cognitive gifts are pro-
gressing rapidly as well. 145
But all the funds needed for such programs could instead be used for
projects that hold out only a very small chance of prolonging the lives
of people who are terminally ill and have yet to reach the end of a
normal lifespan. By advocating government support for people with
intellectual and emotional disabilities, Nussbaum, in view of the scarcity
I" See STEI N, DiSTRIRUTWE JUSTICE AND DISAistLITY, supra note 5, at 190.
to See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, sItpra note I, at 199-216.
"2 See id. at 189-90.
145 See id. at 190,207.
114 See Id. at 219-20.
145 Id. at 207.
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of resources, implicitly rejects a whole host of programs that could also
be directed at those below the capability thresholds but that would be
less beneficial.' 46 Indeed, she also implicitly rejects a whole host of less
beneficial •programs for persons with intellectual disability. Sesha's
mother, Professor Eva Feder Kittay, provides one example of a program
that ended up providing little marginal benefit:
For a while Sesha was enrolled in one of the pilot projects in
early intervention for the developmentally delayed. She made
wonderful progress in the first live months of the program.
But Sesha's story ... was not one of continuing development.
After several years in that same program the improvements
became more and more minimal. 147
Of the three people with intellectual and emotional disabilities whom
Nussbaum discusses, Sesha is farthest from the capability thresholds. 148
All the public resources that are devoted to people with less severe dis-
abilities could instead be lavished on people at Sesha's level. But Nuss-
baum does not advocate such a course. 149
Thus, for resolving conflicts among below-threshold interests, both
within one capability and across capabilities, Nussbaum implicitly gives
a large role to the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism. It
might be thought: Of course. To reject programs that bring hardly any
benefit is simple common sense. And so it is common sense; the bene-
fit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism is part of common sense, part
of practical wisdom. 150
But Nussbaum's effective embrace of utilitarianism for the resolu-
tion of below-threshold conflicts actually goes much farther than an im-
plicit rejection of unlimited funding for claimants with insatiable enti-
tlements who can make only slight improvements. All of Nussbaum's
discussion of expensive programs to benefit the disabled concerns the
United States or other rich countries. For poor countries, Nussbaum
does not advocate such programs. 151
In the United States, disabled children have rights to educational
assistance under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act. 152
146 And she implicitly rejects her own expressed view that the resolution of below-
threshold conflicts is not a matter of justice.
147	 Supra note 78, al 155.
14° NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note I, at 128.
145 Id. at 129 (advocating helping all three individuals).
' 5° See STEIN, Dis•alturrivr., JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 2.
151 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF jusTicE, supra note 1, at 401-02.
' 5 '4 See 20 U.S.C. § I400(d) (1) (A) (2006).
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Sometimes this assistance is given on a one-to-one basis. There may be
need for a sign language interpreter who interprets for only one child
in a class. Or an educational assistant may be assigned to an intellectu-
ally disabled child—once again, on a one-to-one basis.'"
In rich countries such as the United States, the provision of an
educational assistant to one disabled child may be justified on utilitar-
ian grounds, as the use to which the funds would otherwise be put may
not bring greater benefit. I do not believe that the United States de-
votes too many resources to special education. 154 This impressionistic
judgment could be challenged; some other utilitarian observer might
think that if fewer resources were devoted to special education, those
resources could and would do more good elsewhere. The opposing
view, however, certainly could not claim to be an obvious conclusion.
In many poor countries, by contrast, it is obvious that special edu-
cation services of the type described—one-to-one assistance—can rarely
be justified on utilitarian grounds. Of course, some resources of poor
countries should be allocated to the benefit of the disabled in those
countries (and some resources of rich countries should he allocated to
the benefit of the disabled in poor countries). Nevertheless,• many poor
countries do not provide a primary education to all children. If the
choice is between providing an educational assistant to one disabled
child and providing a teacher to thirty nondisabled children, the
teacher should be provided. 155 Nussbaum evidently agrees. 158 For poor
countries, she does not advocate expensive programs of educational
assistance for children with disabilities; she advocates universal primary
education. 157
As previously indicated, Nussbaum cannot reach this differential
result by adjusting the threshold for poor countries: severely disabled
children are below capability thresholds in poor countries, just as they
are in rich countries. 158 The only way Nussbaum can advocate expen-
sive special education programs for rich countries, but not for poor
countries, is through an implicit determination that the funds needed
for such programs would provide greater benefits in poor countries if
used in other ways (such as by achieving universal primary education).
155 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 205-11; STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 51-52.
154 Perhaps the resources devoted to special education could be better allocated,
though.
155 See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, Supra note 5, at 48-54.
156 SeeNUSS13ALN, FRONTIERS or JusTicE, supra note 1, at 401-02,
157 See id.
158 See .supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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It might be wondered: as long as Nussbaum is prepared, in prac-
tice, to apply a benefit-maximizing principle to below-threshold con-
flicts, what does it matter that she refuses to endorse such a principle
explicitly? Under a Nussbaumian system, public funds will be limited,
they will he distributed in a more-or-less utilitarian manner, and they
will run out before they have to be wasted on insatiable entitlements.
So even though Nussbaum's theory requires governments to fund insa-
tiable entitlements, such requirements can effectively be a dead letter.
That is not quite good enough, however. First, it would be nice if
non-utilitarian philosophers, especially those who attack utilitarianism,
could acknowledge the extent to which they must accept the benefit-
maximizing principle of utilitarianism in order to avoid absurd results.
Second, even though Nussbaum's theory is implicitly sensitive to rela-
tive benefit in resolving below-threshold conflicts, it is still an egalitar-
ian theory in dealing with cross-threshold conflicts. 159 As between the
insatiable entitlements of any individual and all the above-threshold
interests of every person in a society, Nussbaum gives priority to the in-
satiable entitlements. 16° If any society (or the entire world) ever reaches
the point where the only people remaining below the capability
thresholds are those with insatiable entitlements, the truly implausible
nature of Nussbaum's cross-threshold egalitarianism becomes apparent.
As Peter Singer observes, Nussbaum's absolute priority for below-
threshold interests
appears to require that if a society has only one member be-
low the minimum entitlement level, it should spend all its re-
sources on bringing that member above the entitlement level
before it spends anything at all on raising the welfare level of
anyone else, no matter how big a difference the resources
could make to everyone else in society. That, surely, is an ab-
surdity. 161
D. Nussbaumian Tax Policy
But the biggest reason why the implicit application of utilitarianism
to below-threshold conflicts cannot cure Nussbaum's theory is that
Nussbaum's cross-threshold egalitarianism bears on the supply of public
funds as well as on spending priorities. The fiscal demands posed by in-
satiable entitlements are, of course, unlimited. 162 For Nussbaum, these
159 See supra notes 39-94 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
161 Singer, supra note 44.
162 See FIUED, supra note 67, at 122.
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demands, along with the demands posed by all other below-threshold
interests, have priority over all above-threshold interests. Therefore, the
government must raise as much revenue as possible from above-
threshold interests and must use that revenue, to the maximum extent,
to satisfy below-threshold interests: IF individuals have property, the loss
of which would not cause anyone to fall below a capability threshold (or
fall farther below a capability threshold); that property must if possible
be taxed away and used to augment, however slightly, the capabilities of
those who are below a threshold.
A Nussbaumian tax policy could be more extreme than one based
on John Rawls's theory. Under Rawls's "difference principle", the abso-
lute limit to redistribution is income equality. 163 As Rawls essentially
defines disadvantage in terms of income and wealth, the least advan-
taged can never be given a greater-than-equal income (in that event,
they would no longer be least advantaged). 164 Under Nussbaum's sys-
tem, by contrast, people with insatiable entitlements can have enor-
mous resources devoted to them and still be entitled to further redis-
tribution from people who have quite modest incomes.
One limit to redistribution would be the same or similar under a
Nussbaumian system as under a Rawlsian system (or, indeed, most any
system): the counterproductivity limit. 165 Tax rates will not be raised
past the point where they actually reduce tax receipts (the maximum of
the so-called "Later Curve"). Although there is great skepticism among
mainstream economists that the United States has in recent decades
been anywhere near the counterproductivity limit, such. a limit pre-
sumably exists. 166 Perhaps, then, the counterproductivity limit can save
Nussbaum's theory from itself, can stop it short of taxing away all
above-threshold wealth. Note, however, that a Nussbaumian tax policy is
not limited to current tax instruments, such as the graduated income
tax. There might be new and different taxes that would increase overall
revenue from above-threshold interests, and if so, those taxes would
have to be imposed.
The utilitarian limit on redistribution is that people must only be
called upon to give up things for the benefit of others if those others
would benefit more; people must never have to give up things to others
163 See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, sutra note 56, at 97-98 (describing representative
individuals "specified by the levels of income and wealth"). To similar effect, see RAWLS,
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 56, at 65.
See RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 97-98.
165 See STEIN, DISTRI Bum? E JusTici: ANn D ISA II/ LITT, Slip/17 note 5, at 79.
166 For a brief review of the literature, see Jon Gruber & Emmanuel Saez,, The Elasticity
of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications, 84 J. Pun. ECON. 1 (2002).
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if those others would benefit less. 167 In principle, Nussbaum's theory
does require people to sacrifice so that others can benefit less—a great
deal less, in fact.' 68 If the counterproductivity limit stops Nussbaum
short of taxing away all above-threshold wealth, and therefore makes
Nussbaum's theory appear more plausible, it is only because the coun-
terproductivity limit fortuitously leads to a result not so far distant from
the utilitarian limit on taxation. 169
Nussbaum asserts that under the capabilities approach "[n]p crea-
ture is being used as a means to the ends of others, or of society as a
whole." 170 This formulation is a little unusual; it departs from the usual
Kantian injunction that people must never be used "merely as a
means." 171 It is unclear whether Nussbaum intends to claim fidelity to a
standard higher than the Kantian one, or whether this is just an er-
ror. 172 In any event, Nussbaum suggests that her theory is superior to
utilitarianism in this respect. because utilitarianism does treat people as
means)"
But to those who are subject to having all of their above-threshold
interests taken away in a Nussbaumian tax system, it must surely seem
not only that they are being used as a means, but also that they are be-
ing used merely as a means. Any sacrifice of their above-threshold in-
terests, no matter how large, is justified, and indeed mandated, if it can
provide any benefit, no matter how small, to someone below a capabil-
ity threshold. This message seems unlikely to garner the political con-
sensus Nussbaum seeks for her theory.
Nussbaum could of course argue that people who have all their
above-threshold interests taken away through taxation are not being
treated solely as means; they are also being treated as ends, as their ca-
pabilities are also guaranteed, up to the threshold level. Similarly, utili-
tarianism takes the position that it never treats people merely as means
since it values equally the welfare of everyone; unlike other theories,
utilitarianism never requires anyone to sacrifice unless others will bene-
167 STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABiLITY, supra note 5, at 33-35.
168 Even prioritarianism sometimes requires redistribution to those who can benefit
less, if they are sufficiently worse off.
169 See id. at 79 (discussing the counter-productivity limit under welfare egalitarianism).
17° NUsSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 351.
171 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC. OF MORALS 97 (H.J. Paton
trans., Harper & Row 1964).
172 At other places, Nussbaum also omits the qualifier "merely." See, e.g., NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 277. She includes the qualifier "merely" in Martha
Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements, in ADMAN DIGNITY AND 1310ETHICS
351,354 (2008). There, however, she is describing the Stoic view, not her own view. Id.
173 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, SUpra note 1, at 351-52.
2009]	 Nussbaum: A Utilitarian Critique	 517
lit more.'" As a matter of moral theory, perhaps neither theory treats
people as mere means. But as a matter of political perception, I believe
that Nussbaum's theory, if ever actually enacted, would more likely ap-
pear to violate the Kantian injunction.
E. A Priority Less Absolute
Because a significant part of my critique of Nussbaum depends on
the conclusion that she gives absolute priority to below-threshold inter-
ests, it may be wondered whether I was uncharitable in reaching that
conclusion in Part 1. 175 In accordance with the principle of charity,
should I not assume that the priority Nussbaum gives to below-threshold
interests is not absolute? The problem is that while it is indeed unchari-
table, from a utilitarian perspective, to interpret Nussbaum as being an
uncompromising cross-threshold egalitarian, it is not uncharitable from
Nussbaum's own perspective. If Nussbaum did not give absolute priority
to below-threshold interests, she could not say that "policies that im-
prove the lot of a group are to be rejected unless they deliver the central
capabilities to each and every person." 176 Nor could she claim that "each
and every citizen is entitled to an ample amount of each of these diverse
goods, seen as capabilities, and . society may not pursue overall advan-
tage in a way that slights any citizen's claim to them ... ." 177
As to conflicts among below-threshold interests, I do conclude
(charitably, from a utilitarian perspective) that Nussbaum's policy
choices reflect the influence of a henefit-maximizing principle. 178 But as
to conflicts between above-threshold interests and below-threshold inter-
ests, such a conclusion is precluded by the central place Nussbaum gives
to the threshold level in her theory, as well as by the above-quoted
statements. It would be well if Nussbaum acknowledged that policies
that improve the lot of a group should sometimes be pursued even
though they do not deliver the central capabilities to every person, and
that society should sometimes pursue overall adVantage in a way that
slights the claims of some people below the capabilities thresholds. 179
174 STIN, DISTRI BUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, .supra note 5, at 33-35.
175 See .sup-a notes 39.-44.
176 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, al 216.
177 Id. at 178.
178 See supra 1101es 140-145.
179 NusSbalitti'S rhetoric to the contrary appears to be drawn from Rawls, See RAWLS, A
`FHEORY OF JUSTICE, s upra note 56, at 3-4 ("Each person possesses an inviolability founded
on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason jus-
tice . . . does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger
sum of advantages enjoyed by many."). Rut as noted infra at text accompanying notes 185— .
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But until she does so acknowledge, the most plausible interpretation of
her theory is that she does indeed give absolute priority to below-
threshold interests.
How have other egalitarian theorists dealt with the problem of in-
satiable entitlements; how have they avoided the "bottomless pit"? 180
Those who seek to equalize welfare (or capabilities) have generally
compromised their egalitarianism by accepting, more explicitly than
Nussbaum, some role for the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitari-
anism. As suggested above, there are two ways to effect this incorpora-
tion of utilitarianism into an egalitarian theory. One way is prioritarian-
ism, which blends the benefit-tnaxirnizing principle and the egalitarian
principle into one composite principle. 181 Another way, which in prac-
tice yields something close to prioritarianism, is an ethical pluralism
that respects both the benefit-maximizing principle of utilitarianism
and the egalitarian principle. 182 Amartya Sett, the father of the capabili-
ties approach, is an ethical pluralist of this type. He concedes that
equality cannot be the sole distributive principle: "[E]quality would
typically be one consideration among many, and this could be com-
bined with aggregative considerations including efficiency."'"
For resource egalitarians, such as Rawls, the problem of insatiable
entitlements is less troublesome. 184 Though Rawls gives absolute priority
to those who are worst off, he uses the metric of material resources (in-
come and wealth) to determine who is worst off. 185 The resourcist met-
ric means that no one can have an entitlement, based on the principle
of equality, to more than an equal share of material resources. People
who would have insatiable entitlements under a welfare-egalitarian the-
ory very quickly reach the limit of their claims under resource egalitari-
anism. But while resource egalitarianism is better able to avoid excessive
redistribution than is welfare egalitarianism (or capabilities egalitarian-
ism), resource egalitarianism has a problem of inadequate redistribu-
186, such sentiments are less extreme in the context of Rawls's theory, as he uses a re-
sourcist metric.
188 See Daniels, supra note 68, at 172.
"il See STEM, DisTunstrrivE jus -ricE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 181.
182 Id.
185 Sere, supra DULL 8, at 92.
014 See generally RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, septa 11010 56. As noted, I do not consider
Ronald Dworkin to be either a resourcist or an egalitarian; his hypothetical-choice dis-
tributive device is essentially utilitarian. See supla note 55; see also STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE Jus-
TICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 119-57.
185 1 speak here of Rawls's theory as set forth in A THEORY 01, jusTIcE, supra note 56, at
97-98. There is a ginger step away front resourcism in RAwLsJusTtc;P: AS FAIRNESS, .septa
11010 56, at 65.1 discuss Rawls's theory in STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY,
supra note 5, at 102-18.
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tion. 186 Resource egalitarianism resists an unequal distribution of re-
sources even when some people would benefit enormously from a
greater-than-equal share—even when they need a greater-than-equal
share to avoid death or horrible pain. 187
The welfare-egalitarian problem of excessive redistribution (shared
by capabilities egalitarianism) and the resource-egalitarian problem of
inadequate redistribution are really two sides of the same coin. Uncom-
promising egalitarian theories of all types are insensitive to relative
benefit, which means that they will either distribute too many resources
to people who would benefit hardly at all (welfare egalitarianism), or
distribute too few resources to people who would benefit enormously
(resource egalitarianism), or both. Only when they compromise their
theories in the direction of utilitarianism—only when they are prepared
to distribute or withhold resources based on how much a claimant
would benefit—can egalitarians achieve a plausible balance. 188 Utilitari-
anism is the golden mean of distributive justice, and egalitarian theories
can achieve plausibility only by moving toward that mean.
Nussbaum incorporates the benefit-maximizing principle of utili-
tarianism, more or less explicitly, in setting the capabilities thresh-
olds. 189 She incorporates utilitarianism implicitly in resolving below-
threshold conflicts. 190 These two assimilations of the utilitarian princi-
ple go a long way to lend plausibility to her theory. Rut she remains an
uncompromising egalitarian as to cross-threshold conflicts, and in that
respect her theory is deeply implausible.
III. CAPABILITIES VERSUS WELFARE
I am more troubled by Nussbaum's principles of distribution (or
lack thereof) than by her metric. I do, however, think that the welfarist
metric is superior to the metric of capabilities. In this Part, I explore
some of the differences between a welfare-based theory and a capabili-
ties-based theory. In the course of doing so, I respond to some of Nuss-
baum's criticisms of utilitarianism, in particular her criticism that utili-
tarianism is wrong to give effect to adaptive preferences.
186 Resource egalitarianism can still require excessive redistribution, from a utilitarian
perspective, if it imposes a tax system that reduces average welfare even as it raises the situ-
ation of the poorest class.
187 SPPSTF:iN, DISTRIBUTIVE: JUSTICE AND DISAPIIIITY, supra note 5 , at 63-75.
188 See id. at 2.
189 SIT NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note I, at 402.
190 See supra notes 145-150.
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A. Objective Versus Subjective View of the Good: Only a Partial Divergence
Most theorists who consider themselves welfarists hold to a subjec-
tive or experiential view of the good. This is certainly true of utilitarians.
Among contemporary utilitarians, the two main conceptions of welfare
are the hedonic account and the informed-preference account. 191 Un-
der the hedonic account, positive welfare is a positive mental state or
subjective experience, such as happiness or enjoyment; negative welfare
is a negative mental state such as unhappiness or suffering. 192 Under the
informed-preference account, positive welfare is the satisfaction of in-
formed preferences, while negative welfare is the frustration of in-
formed preferences. 193
Nussbaum, by contrast, has a partially objective view of the good. 19"
Under her theory, the central capabilities are good for people whether
or not they are experienced as good. The partially objective character
of the capabilities approach, as opposed to what Nussbaum calls "sub-
jective wellarism," 195 can yield criticisms in both directions. It is impor-
tant, however, not to overstate this difference between the metric of
capabilities and the metric of welfare; the two metrics overlap. As Nuss-
baum explains, one reason items are included on the list of capabilities
is that they contribute to the welfare of people under the informed-
preference account of welfare (she refers to it as the "informed desire"
account). 196 Nussbaum states that "the very fact that human beings
characteristically desire play, and intimacy, and control over their envi-
ronment provides at least some reason for politics to secure these
191 See ROBERT GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC Pint.osoetre 12-16 (1995); JAMES
GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 10-1 (1986);
STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DIsABILITY, supra note 5, at 14-16; L.W. SUMNER, WEL
FARE, HAPPINESS, Arqn Princs 113-47, 171-83 (1996); TN. Scanlon, The Moral Basis of Inter-
personal Comparisons, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 17-44 ( Jon Elster &
John Roehner eds., I991).
152 See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 14.
193 I have not yet taken a firm position on what account of welfare is best. I have not
yet had to do so, as 1 am generally interested in issues which pit all forms of utilitarianism
against opposing theories. Nevertheless, I do have considerable sympathy for the good old-
fashioned hedonic account of welfare, at least insofar as issues of distributive justice are
concerned. See STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ANI) DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 15.
194 Nussbaum uses the term "substantive" rather than "objective." See NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 151-52. I believe that die term "objective" more
accurately conveys the distinction between Nussbaum's approach and the two main accounts
of welfare. The hedonic account of welfare might be considered substantive, but it is not
thjeCtive.
195 Id. at 8.
196 Id. at 152.
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things to people, a reason that is not fully reducible to the other rea-
sons we have for saying that these things are good."' 97
By the same token, welfarism is advanced by systematic thinking
about the things that promote welfare. Nussbaum's list of central hu-
man capabilities seems to embody considerable wisdom. Although I
would not take it as the last word, it could be useful to welfarists.
Yet another way in which Nussbaum's capabilities approach con-
verges with welfarism is that the concept of a capability includes an
element of choice or preference at its core. Following Sen, Nussbaum
emphasizes the distinction between functionings and capabilities. 198
Her theory strives to guarantee people the capabilities to exercise vari-
ous functionings (for example, the capability to play, or to commune
with nature), but she would not require people to exercise those lune-
tionings. 199 As Nussbaum observes, the emphasis on capabilities rather
than functionings reduces the paternalism that might otherwise char-
acterize an objective theory of the good. 200
B. Adaptive Preferences
Nussbaum's partially objective view of the good allows her to level
a serious criticism against welfarism, and against utilitarianism in par-
ticular: that utilitarianism wrongly gives effect to adaptive prefer-
ences. 201 This criticism is stressed by Sen; 202 Nussbaum gives it even
more emphasis." Like SC11 , Nussbaum is mainly concerned with adap-
tation to oppression. 2°4
People may adapt to unjust oppression, so that the effect on their
welfare is not as severe as might be expected. From a utilitarian per-
spective, adaptation to oppression seems to lessen the moral urgency of
alleviating oppression. Under Nussbaum's capabilities approach, by
contrast, the urgency of alleviating oppression may he unaffected by
adaptation: oppressed people who are adapted arid those who are un-
adapted both may lack basic capabilities, such as the right to vote, to
197 Id. at 148; Aee also id. at l52 ("Informed desire plays a large role in finding a good
substantive list, for episternic reasons."). I believe that Nussbaum actually understates the
extent to which welfarism is the source of her capabilities list.
198 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 153; SEN, supra
note 8, at 4-5.
199 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, septa note I, at 160.
200 Id. at 160-61.
201 Id. at 139-42.
202 SEN, .supra note 8, at 6-7.
2" NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 140.
209 Id. at. 117-18.
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the same extent. 205 In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum states
that a "habituated preference not to have any one of the items on the
list (political liberties, literacy, equal political rights, or whatever) will
not count in the social choice function „ .."206
The criticism of utilitarianism based on adaptive preferences can
be taken to ridiculous extremes if one postulates "happy slaves," op-
pressed people who arc actually happier under oppression than they
would be if treated fairly. Nussbaum has a generally keen sense of social
reality, so in her hands the argument does not go to this extreme. In-
deed, in Frontiers of Justice, she suggests that it is "extremely likely that
there is no tradition anywhere, nor ever has been, in which its subordi-
nated or minority members simply endorse the lower lot in life they are
offered." 207 Nevertheless, there can be greater and lesser adaptation,
and utilitarianism seems to hold that it is less morally urgent to help
those who are more fully adapted. Is this wrong?
An informed-preference utilitarian might argue that adaptive pref-
erences are not fully informed, and that utilitarianism should therefore
not give effect to them. I would not make this move, however, as I be-
lieve it is right to respect adaptive preferences; adaptation to oppression
does indeed make it less morally urgent to alleviate oppression.
Suppose there are two societies in which women are oppressed in
familiar ways: They cannot. vote, they are excluded from desirable pro-
lessions,they lose legal personhood when they marry, and they suffer
discrimination in divorce law, inheritance law, and so on. There is,
however, a large difference between the two sexist societies in the ex-
tent to which women have adapted to oppression. In one society, there
is a great deal of subjective misery among women. This misery is evi-
denced by past protests that were violently suppressed and are unlikely
to recur. 2°8 It is further evidenced by strenuous attempts to emigrate
(suppose both societies are closed to emigration), and by social science
surveys taken by outsiders. In the other sexist society, women have
adapted to a much greater extent. There is far less opposition to op-
pression and far less discontent.
Suppose now that the international community can force only one
of these societies to eliminate its sexist laws, or can exert pressure on
205 Id. al 149.
200 Id.
207 NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF jusTmE, supra note 1, at 254; see also NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELDPMENT, Supra note 1, at 155.
205 I stipulate that the protests are unlikely to recur because I do not Want to tilt the
hypothetical example by saying that it is necessary to help the unadapted group in order
to prevent violence and death.
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only one society at a time. Should the international community help
the truly miserable, unadapted group first, as utilitarianism recom-
mends? Or should the international community help the group that is
largely adapted to its situation?
Nussbaum's principles do not tell us to help first the unadapted
group that is suffering more. As the women of both societies are below
the capabilities thresholds, Nussbaum's theory does not straightfor-
wardly give priority to one group or another. Indeed, if faced with a de-
cision between helping the two groups, someone applying Nussbaum's
theory might decide that it is morally more urgent to help the group
that is suffering less rather than the group that is suffering more. The
more-adapted and less-suffering group has a kind of "false conscious-
ness," which ranks it lower on some capabilities than the group that is
suffering more. For example, one clement in the capability "Emotions"
is to be able to experience "justified anger." 20
But while Nussbaum's theory does not tell us to help first the
group that is less adapted and thus more miserable, it is clear to me
(and, I hope, to the reader) that we should indeed help that group
first. 21 ° It is morally more urgent to help a group that is suffering, that
is groaning under the yoke of oppression, than to help a group that is
relatively content. Utilitarianism, then, is not morally deficient in giving
weight to adaptive preferences. On the contrary, the moral deficiency
lies with theories that refuse to take adaptive preferences into account.
We should help first the people who are suffering the most, and a the-
ory that does not tell us to do so is wrong. 2"
Of course, this is not the kind of example that critics of utilitarian-
ism have in mind when they speak of adaptive preferences. Instead,
critics envision a scenario in which utilitarianism actually endorses op-
pression because of adaptive preferences. Because adaptive preferences
cause the oppressed to he relatively satisfied, the argument goes, an
end to oppression could hurt the favored group (the oppressors) more
than it benefits the oppressed.
But the preference to oppress is far more adaptable than the pref-
erence not to be oppressed. Are the British any less happy now that
they do not persecute Catholics? Are the French any less happy now
that they, do not persecute Protestants? I do not think so. Since the fa-
vored group can be just as happy in a tolerant regime as in an oppres-
209 NUSS ►AUM, FRONTIERS ()Fps-rick:, sepia note I, at 76-77. Pointing in the other di-
rection, one element in the capability "Senses, Imagination, and Thought" is being able to
'avoid nonbeneficial pain." Id. at 76.
21 ° Absent some unusual circumstances not stipulated here.
2 k 1 For a similar view, see Kaplow, supra note 26, 627-29.
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sive regime, the "joy of oppression" has no weight at all in a long-term
utilitarian analysis, and the suffering of an oppressed group is a total
net loss.
Critics of utilitarianism argue that even if unjust systems of oppres-
sion really do result in lower aggregate welfare, that is too shaky a basis
on which to oppose such injustice. 212
 Surely, the benefits that a favored
group gains from oppression should not be counted at all, even in the
short term. But in fact, we are unlikely to think that a system or institu-
tion is "oppressive" in the first place unless it involves unnecessary suf-
fering. Consider military conscription in time of war. If we only took
account of the burden placed on conscripted soldiers, the loss of liberty
and the danger, we might say that military conscription is horribly op-
pressive and unjust, a system akin to slavery. Yet military conscription is
a good deal more widely accepted than slavery. Why? Because the bene-
fits to society as a whole arc thought to outweigh the burden placed on
conscripted soldiers. 213 Of course, it is easily possible for military con-
scription to reduce the overall welfare of the nation in which it exists, to
say nothing of the welfare of foreigners who may be affected by that
nation's military policies. But the general point is that we do count
benefits in determining whether a practice constitutes immoral oppres-
sion. It is only after we have counted the benefits and made an intuitive
finding of unnecessary suffering that we come to believe that the bene-
fits to those we consider oppressors do not count at all.
C. Incommensurability ?
Another difference that Nussbaum stresses between her own ap-
proach and wellarism is that she holds goods to be incommensurable,
meaning that they cannot be reduced to a single scale of value. 214 She
states that "[i] t is of the essence of the focus on capabilities to insist that
the primary goods to be distributed by society are plural and not single,
and that they are not commensurable in terms of any single quantita-
tive standard." 215 Wellarists, by contrast, believe that goods are com-
mensurable in terms of welfare.
It is usual to distinguish incommensurability from incomparability.
Incomparability means that goods cannot be compared. 216 Nussbaum's
21s
	 Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 1 , at 19.
M The Supreme Court held, in a World War I-era case, that conscription does not vio-
late the Thirteenth Amendment. The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,390 (1918).
214 NusstialM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, Supra note 1, at 165-66.
515
216 Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTI-
cm, REASON 1,2 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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view is that incommensurability does not entail incomparability: it is or
may be possible to choose well among different goods, even if it is im-
possible to reduce those goods to a single scale of value. 2"
It may also be useful to distinguish a variety of positions on a spec-
trum from complete commensurability to complete incommensurabil-
ity. Complete commensurability means that all goods can he reduced to
a single scale of value; complete incommensurability means that no two
goods can be so reduced. In between are various degrees of partial
commensurability. I do not think that a welfltrist need he committed to
complete commensurability; pockets of incommensurability may exist.
There has been considerable discussion of incommensurability
and the law, in areas such as surrogacy."' I will not address such issues;
I am concerned here with the relationship between Nussbaum's theory
and the doctrine of incommensurability. The chief elements of Nuss-
baum's theory that might he thought to reflect a denial of'commensu-
rability are its lack of principles to resolve conflicts among below-
threshold interests and its absolute priority for below-threshold inter-
ests as against above-threshold interests. As argued above, these are the
least plausible elements of Nussbaum's theory. If a commitment to the
doctrine of incommensurability has motivated these elements, it has
had a truly baleful effect on her theory. In any event, while the lack of
principles for below-threshold conflict does reflect a partial rejection of
commensurability, the absolute priority for below-threshold interests
does not. Indeed, the latter feature of Nussbaum's theory establishes a
kind of commensurability.
Nussbaum's absolute priority for below-threshold interests prohib-
its tradeoffs that place people below the threshold of one capability in
order to give them (or others) a super-threshold amount of some other
capability. Nussbaum evidently has this sort of tradeoff in mind when
she writes that "the capabilities arc radically nonfUngible: lacks in one
area cannot be made up simply by giving people a larger amount of
another capability."219 Similarly, she states that "we should: not give up
on emotional health to achieve a great deal of employment opportu-
nity, or on self-respect in order to achieve a great deal of health." 220
217 Nussbaum, Costs of Tragedy, supra note 1, at 1030-31.
218 See, e.g., Richard Croswell, Incommensurability, Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1419 (1998); Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Rider
of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683; Cass R. Stinstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in
Law, 92 Mitt[. L. REV. 779 (1994).
219 NUSSEAt181, FRONTIERS or JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 1116-67.
220 Id. at 73.
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Such statements suggest that there is some general bar to tradeoffs
among capabilities, and that the bar to tradeoffs derives from Nuss-
baum's rejection of commensurability. 221 In fact, the opposite is true.
Nussbaum's theory actually insists on tradeoffs if it is possible to make
them in the opposite direction, if it is possible to give people a below-
threshold increase in one capability by taking away from them (or oth-
ers) an above-threshold amount of some other capability. Although we
cannot "give up on emotional health [below the threshold] to achieve a
great deal of employment opportunity [above the threshold]," 222 we
must give up emotional health above the threshold in order to increase
employment opportunity below the threshold.
The reason tradeoffs in the wrong direction are barred is not be-
cause Nussbaum's theory treats the capabilities as incommensurable;
rather, tradeoffs in the wrong direction are barred, and reverse trade-
offs are mandated, because she treats the capabilities as commensurable
in cross-threshold conflicts. Nussbaum's cross-threshold egalitarianism
establishes a single scale of value as between above-threshold interests
and below-threshold interests: all below-threshold interests have abso-
lute priority over all above-threshold interests. This single scale of value
then determines the permissibility of tradeoffs, prohibiting some and
mandating others. It is not a correct scale of value, either as a norma-
tive prescription or as a description of people's preferences—but it is a
scale. Moreover, the permissibility of cross-threshold tradeoff's does not
depend on whether they are between capabilities or within capabilities.
A tradeoff within capabilities is prohibited if it is in the wrong direction
and a tradeoff between capabilities is mandated if it is in the right di-
rection. 223
While there is commensurability across the threshold in Nuss-
baum's theory, there is incommensurability below the threshold. The
lack of any principles to resolve below-threshold conflict means that
one must choose among below-threshold interests as if they were not
reducible to a single scale of value. One must engage in intuitionistic
balancing, which is how one chooses among incommensurable goods.
Here, too, however, it does not matter whether, competing below-
threshold interests pertain to the same capability or different capabili-
ties. Nussbaum offers no explicit principles to resolve conflicts within
one capability (for example, between those who can gain the greatest
increase in capability and those who have the least capability), any
221 See also Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 1, at 19.
222 NussBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, Supra note 1, at 73.
222 Unless there is another cross-threshold tradeoff in the right direction available, in
which case each is permissible.
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more than she offers principles to resolve conflicts among different
capabilities.
So if two interests are on opposite sides of the threshold, there is
full commensurability: one has either infinitely more value or infinitely
less. If two interests arc on the same side of the threshold,. there is in-
commensurability. And in neither case does it matter whether the two
interests pertain to the same capability or different capabilities. 224 In
sum, Nussbaum's theory does not have the relationship to incom-
mensurability that her statements suggest.
D. Paternalism and Diktat
Although Nussbaum's emphasis on capabilities as opposed to func-
tionings reduces the paternalism of her theory, and aligns it more
closely with welfarism, there is still a potential for paternalism in Nuss-
baum's theory, and even for what might be called dictatorship. There is
also a potential for paternalism in utilitarianism.
Under Nussbaum's theory, society must devote resources to devel-
oping certain capabilities of people up to a threshold leve1. 225 This
might not be the use of resources that people would most prefer, or
that would make them happiest. Indeed, following the work of Profes-
sors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, 226 we can see that it is possible
for everyone to be worse off, in terms of subjective welfare, under
Nussbaum's capabilities approach than under a welfarist system that
devotes the same amount of resources to satisfying below-threshold in-
terests. Suppose that everyone would like to have a super-threshold
amount of one capability (not the same one for all), and in exchange
everyone would he willing to fall below the threshold of another capa-
bility (not the same one for all). Nussbaum's approach would not per-
mit such variable capability allotments, and so could make everyone
worse off.
Fleshing out this idea, we may suppose that the government guar-
antees to each person a certain level of material resources (income or
wealth), and that each person decides which capabilities to pursue. The
guaranteed resource level is not the same for everyone; rather, we ap-
224 This is not to say that the classification of interests as pertaining to one or another
capability is completely irrelevant. Given that an interest is above or below the threshold,
classification is basically irrelevant. But the classification of an interest might bear on
whether it is considered an above-threshold interest or a below-threshold interest
225 See NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note I, at 182.
725 See generally Kapiow & Shaven, supra note 59. Even more relevant here is Louis Kap-
low, Primary Goods, Capabilities, ... or Well-Being?, supra note 26 (focusing on the work of
Sett rather than Nussbaum).
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proximate the amount of resources that would be devoted to people
under Nussbaum's system, allocating more resources to people who
would need more resources to reach the various thresholds. But once
the cash is distributed to people, they can spend it on anything. They
can buy health insurance, join nature clubs, take adult education
classes, and so on. If all choose to spend their resource allotments so as
to rise above the threshold of some capabilities and fall below the
threshold of others, it is possible that everyone will be better off, in
terms of welfare, than they would be under Nussbaum's system.
This example points to a possible ambiguity in Nussbaum's con-
ception of capability. If a person is given enough money to rise to the
threshold of capability X, but decides to spend the money on other
things, does that mean that she really did have capability X, up to the
requisite threshold, all along? If a person is given enough money to
purchase health insurance, does that satisfy her capability to have good
health, even if she decides not to purchase insurance? If so, it is hard to
generate the Kaplow/Shavell critique.
Let us assume, however, that unrestricted cash would not satisfy , the
requirements of Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Rather, to bring
someone to the threshold of the health capability, the government
must provide universal health coverage, or perhaps distribute vouchers
that can be used only to purchase health insurance. Even so, I confess
that I do not think Nussbaum's theory is much damaged by the mere
possibility that everyone could be worse off under her theory than if
they received unrestricted cash. While I support cash assistance to the
pool; I seriously doubt that the best way to promote the welfare of peo-
ple (at least, those living in a rich country) is to give them unrestricted
cash as a substitute for traditional welfare-state programs such as uni-
versal health coverage. 227
My skepticism about replacing all welfare-state programs with
grants of unrestricted cash reflects paternalism. 228 A weifarist can be a
paternalist, whether he holds to the informed-preference account of
welfare or the hedonic account. An informed-preference welfarist can
frustrate the actual preferences of people in order to satisfy the prefer-
ences people would have if they were fully informed; a hedonic welfa-
227 I am far more sympathetic to cash assistance in the context of foreign aid. See The
Pushpin Pundit, Africa Needs a BIG Experiment (May 21, 2006), http://www.pushpinpun-
dit.com/vIn8052106.hun (discussing proposed basic income grant programs in South Af-
rica); The Pushpin Pundit, The International Food Stamp, (Mat 28, 2006), http://wray.
pushpinpundit.com/v1n1032806.1itm (arguing in favor of an international food stamp pro-
gram).
228 A defense of this paternalism is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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rist can frustrate the actual preferences of people (and even their in-
formed preferences) to make them happier.
Indeed, a welfarist can be more paternalistic, in some respects,
than a follower of Nussbaum's capabilities approach, as that approach
aims at capabilities rather than functionings. A welfarist might, for ex-
ample, promote the health of people in disregard of their current
preferences, while a follower of the capabilities approach might say that
it is enough for government to provide people with the capability to be
healthy; government need not go further and prevent people from ru-
ining their own health.
Nussbaum's own thinking on government promotion of health
seems to have evolved in a libertarian direction. In Women and Human
Development, she wrote: "We may feel that health is a human good
that has value in itself, independent of choice, and that it is not unrea-
sonable for government to take a stand on its importance in a way that
to some extent (though not totally) bypasses choice." 229 In Frontiers of
Justice, however, she expresses disagreement with the view, which she
attributes to Professor Richard Arneson, that "it is appropriate for po-
litical planning to promote actual health as a social goal rather than
merely to promote the capability to choose a healthy life. " 250
Both utilitarians and capabilities theorists can be accused of unjus-
tified paternalism. The difference between the two theories may not be
so great on this score, but it still favors utilitarianism. It is one thing to
disregard the actual preferences of people in the course of raising their
welfare; it is quite another thing to disregard the actual preferences of
people if you are going to lower their welfare.
Nussbaum's advocacy of the metric of capabilities is not convinc-
ing. However, the metric of capabilities is sufficiently close to the metric
of welfare so that the difference in distributive principles, as between
utilitarianism and Nussbaum's capabilities approach, is in my view far
more important than the difference in metric. 25 t I would vastly prefer a
theory that used the same principle as utilitarianism (benefit maximiza-
tion), but Nussbaum's metric (capabilities), to a theory that used the
same metric as utilitarianism (welfare), but Nussbaum's principle (suf-
229 NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 91.
250 NUSSEiAUM, FRONTIERS OF jusTicE, supra note 1, at 171. Nussbatun dues endorse
"education about risk." Id.
291 In STEIN, DISTRIBUTIVE jusTux. AND DISABILITY, supra note 5, at 181-82,187-89, I
actually treat the capabilities metric as a kind of welfarism. To some extent, Ronald
Dworkin does likewise. See DwoaxiN, supra note 55, at 285-303.
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licientarianism). In other words, I would vastly prefer capabilities
maximization to welfare sufficientarianism. 232
CONCLUSION
Nussbaum's theory is least plausible where it departs the farthest
from utilitarianism. She could regain plausibility by moving in the di-
rection of utilitarianism: relaxing the absolute priority for below-
threshold interests and explicitly announcing that at least one impor-
tant principle governing conflicts among below-threshold interests is
that resources should go to those who can most benefit. 233 How easy
would it be for Nussbaum to make these adjustments?
On relaxing the absolute priority for below-threshold interests,
Nussbaum's past failure to confront the problem of insatiable entitle-
ments actually represents an opportunity. She can determine that in
view of insatiable entitlements, it is no longer "hard to know" what
could make one abandon cross-threshold egalitarianism. 234 Nussbaum's
willingness to consider relative benefit in initially setting the thresholds
also could support a decision to consider relative benefit in cross-
threshold conflicts. 235 On below-threshold conflicts, Nussbaum's read-
ers probably assume, based on her policy choices, that the benefit-
maximizing principle would have a role in resolving such conflicts, so
making that role explicit may not be so big a step.
The biggest impediment to these salutary changes in Nussbaum's
principles may he her commitment to the capabilities metric. if Nuss-
baum were to use a benefit-maximizing principle to resolve below-
threshold conflicts within one capability, the next logical step would be
to use a benefit-maximizing principle to resolve below-threshold con-
flicts across capabilities. 236 But once Nussbaum explicitly endorsed such
principled tradeoffs across capabilities, the capabilities metric might
252 Though under a capabilities maximization theory, there would still have to be some
way to snake tradeoffs across capabilities.
293
	 suggested above, Nussbaum would not have to move all the way to the benefit-
maximizing principle of utilitarianism; a prioritarian principle, which mixes benefit-max-
imizing and egalitarian elements, would do the trick almost as well.
2" See Nussbaum, Costs of Tragedy, supra note 1, at 1029.
235
	
Nussbaunt's willingness to consider relative benefit in initially setting the
thresholds may not be as prominent a part of her theory as my presentation suggests. In
Frontiers of Justice, it is not until near the end of the book that she abjures setting the
thresholds In a utopian or unrealistic way." NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note
1, at 402.
2" As suggested above, Nussbaum has already done so implicitly. By urging the alloca-
tion of public resources to certain programs, such as special education, she implicitly re-
jects other programs, serving other below-threshold interests, that could consume all the
available funds.
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begin to seem superfluous; she might be drawn to the metric of wel-
fare. Similarly, once Nussbaum abandoned her implausible single scale
of value for cross-threshold tradeoffs (below-threshold interests having
infinitely more value than above-threshold interests), she might be
drawn to the more plausible welfarist scale. While the capabilities met-
ric is not, in itself, one of the most objectionable features of Nuss-
baum's theory, it may prevent her from altering those features.
